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Abstract
Mechanism design deals with distributed algorithms that are executed with self-interested agents. The
designer’s, whose objective is to optimize some function of the agents private types, needs to construct
a computation that takes into account agent incentives which are not necessarily in alignment with the
objective of the mechanism. Traditionally, mechanisms are designed for agents who only care about
the utility they derive from the mechanism outcome. This outcome often fully or partially discloses
agent declare types. Such mechanisms may become inadequate when agents are privacy-aware, i.e.,
when their loss of privacy adversely affects their utility. In such cases ignoring privacy-awareness in the
design of a mechanism may render it not incentive compatible, and hence inefficient. Interestingly, and
somewhat counter-intuitively, Xiao [eprint 2011] has recently showed that this can happen even when
the mechanism preserves a strong notion of privacy. Towards constructing mechanisms for privacy-aware
agents, we put forward and justify a model of privacy-aware mechanism design. We then show that
privacy-aware mechanisms are feasible. The following is a summary of our contributions:
• Modeling privacy-aware agents: We propose a new model of privacy-aware agents where agents
need only have a conservative upper bound on how loss of privacy adversely affects their utility.
This is in deviation from prior modeling which required full characterization.
• Privacy of the privacy loss valuations: Privacy valuations are often sensitive on their own.
Our model of privacy-aware mechanisms takes into account the loss of utility due to information
leaked about these valuations.
• Guarantees for agents with high privacy valuations: As it is impossible to guarantee in-
centive compatibility for agents that have arbitrarily high privacy valuations, we require a privacy-
aware mechanism to set a threshold such that the mechanism is incentive compatible w.r.t. agents
whose privacy valuations are below the threshold, and differential privacy is guaranteed for all other
agents.
• Constructing privacy-aware mechanisms: We first construct a privacy-aware mechanism for
a simple polling problem, and then give a more general result, based on recent generic construction
of approximately additive mechanisms by Nissim, Smorodinsky, and Tennenholtz [ITCS 2012]. We
show that under a mild assumption on the distribution of privacy valuations (namely, that valuations
are bounded for all but a diminishing fraction of the population) these constructions are incentive
compatible w.r.t. almost all agents, and hence give an approximation of the optimum. Finally, we
show how to apply our generic construction to get a mechanism for privacy-aware selling of digital
goods.
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done while the author was visiting the cryptography group at Bar-Ilan University.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design deals with distributed algorithms that are executed with self-motivated agents who opti-
mize their own objective functions. The mechanism designer, interested in computing some function of the
agents’ private inputs (henceforth types), needs hence to construct a computation that takes into account
the agents’ incentives, which are not necessarily in alignment with the goals of the designer. Settings where
mechanism design is instrumental include centralized allocation of resources, pricing, the level of provision of
a public good, etc. Traditionally, agents are modeled to care about the utility they derive from the outcome
of the mechanism, but not about their privacy. Consequently, in many cases the outcome of the mechanism
fully discloses the types declared by (some or all) agents.
We look at a model where agents also assign non-positive utility to the leakage of information about
their private types through the public outcome of the mechanism. This modeling is relevant, e.g., when
private information is aggregated via markets which provide superior prediction power (e.g., [WZ04]), kidney
exchange markets where information aggregation and sharing lead to huge health-care benefits (e.g., [AR11]),
or recommendation engines which assist individuals in locating optimal products. Such markets may not be
incentive compatible and consequently can fail if agents’ privacy is not accounted for.
Our work is on the interface of the research in Algorithmic Game Theory and the recent theoretical
research of privacy. Earlier scholarly work by McSherry and Talwar [MT07] has forged a link between the
notion of differential privacy [DMNS06] and mechanism design. They observed that differential privacy can
serve as a tool for constructing mechanisms where truthfulness is ε-dominant. A recent work [NST12] has
observed a few weaknesses in constructions resulting from [MT07] and resolved them by putting forward
a general framework for constructing approximately-optimal mechanisms where truthfulness is a dominant
strategy or an ex-post Nash equilibrium. This line of work demonstrates that differential privacy can serve
as a powerful tool for the construction of efficient mechanisms.
The mechanisms presented in [MT07, NST12] were not analyzed with respect to agents who take into
account their dis-utility due to the information leaked about their types. We call this dis-utility information
utility and we call privacy-aware agents those agents that take the information utility into account. It might
be tempting to think that the combination of truthfulness and differential privacy is always sufficient for
making privacy-aware agents truthful – mechanisms that are truthful and preserve differential privacy should
remain truthful also with respect to agents that take information utility into account. A work of Xiao [Xia11]
dispels this intuition by showing a mechanism that preserves differential privacy and is truthful with respect
to agents that are not privacy aware, yet, under what seems to be a reasonable definition of information
utility, truthfulness is not dominant with respect to privacy-aware agents.
A recent work of Ghosh and Roth [GR11] constructs mechanisms that compensate agents for their loss in
privacy. Ghosh and Roth consider a setting where a data analyst wishing to perform a differentially private
computation of a statistic pays the participating agents for using their data. They construct mechanisms
where agents declare how their loss of utility depends on the privacy parameter, and the mechanism decides
upon which agents’ information will be used in the computation and how much they will be paid. Inter-
estingly, the mechanisms presented in [GR11] do not preserve the privacy of the loss valuations. However
an agent value for privacy can reveal information about the agents’ private data: it is not unreasonable to
assume that there is some correlation between the price and agents sets on her privacy and the unlikelihood
of her private data or, in other words, to assume that people value their privacy more if they have something
to hide.
In light of these issues, our goal is to construct mechanisms for privacy-aware agents, where privacy is
accounted for the ‘traditional’ inputs to the mechanism (such as valuations, locations, etc.) but also, and
for the first time to the best of our knowledge, with respect to the privacy valuation itself.
The results of [GR11] show, however, that this goal is too ambitious – no individually rational mechanism
can compensate individuals for the information (dis)utility incurred due to information leaked about the
privacy valuation from the public output unless the privacy valuations are bounded. To overcome this
obstacle we focus on mechanisms for large populations of agents: We propose a relaxation where loss in
privacy is accounted for all agents whose valuations are bounded, where the bound increases as the agent
population grows. Hence, in large enough populations truthfulness is provided for all (or most of) the agents.
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For the small fractions of agents who value their privacy too much for the mechanism to compensate, we
provide ε-differential privacy with respect to whether their privacy valuations exceed the bound. The value
of ε improves (i.e., reduces) with the population size.
1.1 Our Contributions
Modeling The main contribution of this work is a new notion of privacy-aware mechanism design where
we examine critically previous modelings propose and justify a new model for privacy aware agents.
We model privacy-aware agents to hold a ‘traditional’ game type and a privacy type, where for the latter
agents need only have a conservative upper bound on how loss of privacy adversely affects their utility. Agents
care about leakage of information on both their game and privacy types. These features are in an important
difference with respect to previous work (e.g., [GR11]) where a full characterization of the information utility
was required to achieve truthfulness, and furthermore, mechanisms did not take into account the information
cost of the privacy type.
Note that if agents can have arbitrarily high privacy valuations, then it is impossible to a priori bound the
information of a computation whose outcome depends on agents’ private inputs, or, alternatively, on their
choice whether to participate or not (see also a more elaborate argument in [GR11] in the specific context of
mechanisms for selling private information for statistical computations). To sidestep this inherent difficulty,
we opt for a lesser requirement from a privacy-aware mechanism: the mechanism should set a threshold on
the privacy valuation vmax and a privacy parameter ε such that the mechanism is incentive compatible w.r.t.
agents whose privacy valuations are below vmax and ε-differential privacy is guaranteed for all agents.
Construction of Privacy-Aware Mechanisms We next demonstrate that privacy-aware mechanisms
are feasible. Our first result illustrates some of our techniques: in Section 4.1, we provide a simple privacy-
aware poll between two or more alternatives. The main idea is to make (traditional) dis-utility due to
mis-reporting dominate the information utility, and hence preserve truthfulness. We set a bound vmax on
the privacy valuations, and treat agents differently according to whether their valuations are above vmax or
not: for agents whose privacy valuations is below the bound, the mechanism ensures that the agents are
provided with a fair reimbursement for their privacy loss. For agents whose privacy valuations are too high
for the mechanism to compensate, we provide that their privacy valuations are protected in a ε-differentially
private way. As discussed above, this is in a sense the best we can hope to achieve. We then move our
attention to large populations and we introduce the notion of admissible populations by making a somewhat
mild assumption on the distribution of the valuations (i.e., finiteness of its moments).
In Section 5 we present a generic construction of privacy-aware mechanism. Our construction is based
on the recent construction of [NST12], where we modify the mechanism and its analysis to accommodate
privacy-agents sampled from an admissible population. We show that the mechanism achieves truthfulness
for most agents and non-trivial accuracy. Finally in Section 5.2 we present a natural example of a privacy-
aware mechanism that falls in our framework i.e., privacy-aware selling of digital goods.
In a sense, our results show that when the outcome of a truthful (not necessarily privacy-aware) mech-
anism is insensitive to each of its individual inputs (as is often the case when the underlying population
is large), it is rational for most privacy-aware agents to report truthfully. This is because the information
leaked about their private types is small, and hence bounded away from the decrease in utility that can be
caused by misreporting their type.
1.2 Other Related Work
The cryptographic literature also includes references to “privacy preserving mechanism design” (an example
is Naor, Pinkas and Sumner [NPS99]). We stress that our goals are different from these cryptographic
realizations of mechanisms as in our setting the agents are worried about what the public outcome of a
mechanism may leak about their types and privacy valuations, whereas the goal of cryptographic realizations
of mechanisms is to hide all information except for the outcome of the mechanism. As showed in [MNT09],
using cryptography to implement mechanism designs over an internet-like network is a non-trivial task, and
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one needs to make sure that the properties of the mechanism (e.g., truthfulness) are preserved also by the
cryptographic implementation of the mechanism.
Independently from our work, Chen, Chong, Kash, Moran, and Vadhan [CCK+11] also studied the
problem of truthful mechanisms in the presence of agents that value privacy. The motivation for both their
work and ours is similar, and in both the quantification of privacy loss corresponds to the effect an agent’s
input has on the outcome of a mechanism. The model [CCK+11] present for privacy-aware agents (and
hence privacy-aware mechanisms) is different from ours in that in [CCK+11] agents are assumed to value
privacy on a per-outcome basis, whereas our modeling utilizes a weaker assumption about the agents, i.e.,
that their privacy valuations depend on the overall (i.e., worst) outcome of the mechanism. Both modelings
are well motivated, our reliance on a weaker assumption may lead to more robust mechanisms, where the
per-outcome approach may lead to a richer set of privacy-aware mechanisms.
2 Preliminaries
We refer to discrete sets T and S as the type set, and the set of social alternatives respectively. For two
vectors t, t′ ∈ T n we define the Hamming distance between t and t′ as the number of entries on which t, t′
differ, i.e., |{i : ti 6= t′i}|. Vectors that are within Hamming distance one are called neighboring. A mechanism
M : T n → ∆(S) is a function that assigns for any vector of inputs t ∈ T n a distribution over S (the notation
∆(S) denotes the set of probability distributions over the set S). The outcome of an execution of M on
input t ∈ T n is an element s ∈ S chosen according to the distribution M(T ).
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06]). A mechanism M : T n → ∆(S) preserves ε-differential
privacy if for all neighboring t, t′ ∈ T n and for all (measurable) subsets S′ of S it holds that
M(t)(S′) ≤ eε ·M(t′)(S′).
The following simple lemma follows directly from the above definition (the proofs for Lemma 1 and
Theorem 1 below are not new and are included for completeness in Appendix A):
Lemma 1. Let M : T n → ∆(S) be a mechanism that preserves ε-differential privacy and let g : S → R≥0.
Then, for all neighboring t, t′ ∈ T n
Es∼M(t)[g(s)] ≤ eεEs∼M(t′)[g(s)].
In particular, if ε ≤ 1 and g : S → [0, 1],
∣∣Es∼M(t)[g(s)]− Es∼M(t′)[g(s)]∣∣ < 2ε.
A simple corollary of Lemma 1 is that
∣∣Es∼M(t)[gˆ(s)]−Es∼M(t′)[gˆ(s)]∣∣ < 4ε for neighboring t, t′ and
gˆ : S → [−1, 1].
Definition 2 ([MT07]). Let f : S × T n → R≥0 and let ε > 0. The exponential mechanism for f with
parameter ε is
M εf (t)(s) =
exp(εf(s, t))∑
s′∈S exp(εf(s
′, t))
for all s ∈ S.
Theorem 1 ([MT07]). Let ∆f be the maximum over all s ∈ S and neighboring t, t′ ∈ T n of f(s, t)−f(s, t′).
M
ε
2∆f
f preserves ε-differential privacy.
Definition 3 (Mutual Information). Let X,Y be two random variables. The mutual information between
X and Y is defined as
I(X ;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ),
where H(X) = −∑x∈S Pr[X = x] · log (Pr[X = x]) is the Shannon entropy of X.
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It is well known that I(X ;Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ), i.e. I(X ;Y ) measures the reduction in entropy in X
caused by conditioning on Y (and symmetrically, I(X ;Y ) = I(Y ;X) = H(Y ) − H(Y |X)). The following
simple observation follows from the data processing inequality (see, e.g., [CT91, pp. 32]):
Observation 1. For all (randomized) functions f , I(f(X);Y ) ≤ I(X,Y ).
Observation 2. Let M : T n → ∆(S) be an ε differentially private mechanism, then for all random variables
X = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ ∆(T n) it holds that I(Xi;M(X), X−i) ≤ ε.
3 Quantifying Information Utility
Our model is similar to the standard model of mechanism design, with the difference that agents participating
in the execution of a mechanism care about their privacy. In the standard model, an agent’s type ti expresses
quantities such as a valuation of a good for sale, location, etc., the mechanism chooses an alternative s, and
the agent’s utility is a function of ti and s (and sometimes, monetary transfers).
When considering privacy-aware agents, we need to introduce the information utility into their utility
functions. A first issue that emerges is how should this dis-utility be quantified? Note that as different agents
may value privacy differently, the quantification should be parametrized by agents’ privacy preferences. We
denote by vi the privacy preference of agent i. That is, an agent type is now composed of the ‘traditional’
type ti, and a privacy preference vi. A second issue that now emerges is that the alternative chosen by the
mechanism can leak information about both ti and vi, and hence leakage about vi needs also be taken into
account.
How is information utility quantified in prior work In an early work, McGrew, Porter, and Shoham
[MPS03] introduced privacy into agents’ utility in the context of non-cooperative computing (NCC) [ST05].
In their model, agents only care about the case where other agents learn their private types with certainty.
This means that privacy is either completely preserved or completely breached, and hence information utility
is quantified to be either zero (no breach) or an agent dependent value vi > 0. As it is often the case that
leaked information is partial or uncertain, we are interested in more refined measures that take partial
exposure into account.
A recent work by Ghosh and Roth [GR11] considers a setting where a data analyst wishes to perform
a computation that preserves ε-differential privacy and compensates participating agents for their privacy
loss. They assume a model where each agent’s dis-utility is proportional to the privacy parameter ε. I.e.,
the ith agent’s dis-utility is
uinfi = vi · ε,
where vi ≥ 0 is part of the agent’s private type. A problem with this quantification is that while ε measures
the worst effect the ε-differentially private computation can have on privacy, the typical effect on agent i
can be significantly lower (see [DRV10]). Furthermore, it can depend on the other agents’ inputs to the
computation. Another problem, that will be further discussed later, is that this quantification does not
consider the information utility due to leakage of information about vi itself.
The third example we are aware of is from another recent work, by Xiao [Xia11]. Similarly to the present
work, Xiao considers the setting of mechanism design with privacy-aware agents. The information utility is
modeled to be
uinfi = vi · I(ti;M(t−i, σ(ti))),
where vi ≥ 0 is the agent privacy valuation. Note that with this measure, the dis-utility of agent i depends
on the distribution of her and the other agents’ types, and on her own strategy σ. The following example
demonstrates that this dependency on σ is problematic.
Consider the single-agent mechanism below, where the agent’s private type consists of a single bit:
Example 1 (The “Rye or Wholewheat” game). Alice is preparing a sandwich for Bob and inquires whether
he prefers Rye (R) or Wholewheat (W). Bob wants to enjoy his favorite sandwich, but does not want Alice
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to learn his preference. Assume that Bob’s type is uniformly chosen in {R,W} and consider these two
possibilities for Bob’s strategy:
1. If Bob provides his true preference he will enjoy the sandwich. However, his information (dis)utility
would be maximized as I(tBob;M(σtruthful(tBob))) = 1.
2. If Bob answers at random he will enjoy the sandwich with probability one-half.1 However, as his
response does not depend on his preference no loss in privacy would be incurred, hence we get
I(tBob;M(σrandom(tBob))) = 0 .
Note that since Bob’s type is R or W with equal probability Alice’s views of Bob’s actions (and hence
also the outcome of the mechanism) are distributed identically whether he uses σtruthful or σrandom. Hence,
while mutual information differs dramatically between the two strategies – suggesting that Bob is suffering a
privacy loss due to Alice learning his type in one but not in the other – it is impossible for Alice to distinguish
between the two cases!
A few more words are in place regarding the source of this problem. First note that while the example
demonstrates that I(tBob;M(σ(tBob))) is a problematic as a measure of privacy it does not imply that
σrandom (nor the one time pad) is at fault (in fact, σrandom provides Bob with perfect privacy even in a
setting where Alice gets to know which strategy Bob uses, a guarantee σtruthful definitely does not provide).
What the example capitalizes on is the fact that the standard game-theoretic modeling does not rule out
the possibility that Alice does not get to see what Bob’s strategy is. In such situations, it can happen that
the more robust σrandom is an overkill, as it provides Bob with less utility. We hence argue that the notion
of information cost should be free of making assumptions on Alice’s knowledge of σ.
3.1 Our Approach
We deviate from the works cited above as we do not present a new measure for information utility. We use
a significantly weaker notion instead. To motivate our approach, re-consider the measures discussed above.
Looking first at the measure in [GR11], i.e., vi · ε, we note that while in ε-differential mechanisms the
ratio Pr[M(t) = s]/Pr[M(t′) = s] is bounded by eε for all neighboring t, t′ and s, it is plausible that the
worst case behavior (i.e., outputting s such that Pr[M(t) = s]/Pr[M(t′) = s] = eε) occurs with only a tiny
probability. This suggest that while vi · ε may not be a good measure for information utility, it can serve
as a good upper bound for this utility. Examining the measure in [Xia11] and trying to avoid the problem
demonstrated in Example 1 above, we note that by Observation 1 I(ti;M(t)) ≥ I(ti;M(t−i, σ(ti))) for all
σ, hence, we get that vi · I(ti;M(t)) is another plausible upper bound for information utility. Finally, taking
into account Observation 2 we get that I(ti;M(t)) ≤ ε and hence we choose to use vi · ε as it is the weaker
of these bounds.
Note 1. We emphasize that although our usage of the term vi · ε is syntactically similar to that of [GR11],
our usage of this quantity is conceptually very different. In particular, while loss of privacy cannot be used
in our constructions for deterring non-truthful agents, the constructions (and proofs) in [GR11] use the fact
that the information utility is (at least) vi · ε for arguing truthfulness.
Note 2. Lemma 1 supports using vi · ε as an upperbound for information utility in the follwing sense. An
individual’s concern about her privacy corresponds to a potential decrease in future utility due to information
learned about her. an upper bound on information utility hence should correspond to this (potential) loss in
future utility. By Lemma 1, the information contributed by individual i affects the expectation of every non-
negative (similarly, non-positive) function g by at most a factor of eε. Let Gi : S → R describe how the
future utility of individual i depends on the outcome of M . By Lemma 1, the information utility of that
individual is bounded by
max
t∈Tn
(eε − 1) · Es∼M(t) |Gi(s)| ≈ ε ·max
t∈Tn
Es∼M(t) |Gi(s)| ,
1This is equivalent to encrypting Bob’s type using a one time pad.
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where the approximation holds for small ε. See also a related discussion in [GR11].
Privacy of vi The mechanisms presented in [GR11] for selling private information do not protect the
privacy of vi nor they account for the information (dis)utility generated by the leakage of vi. It is further
shown that with unbounded vis it is impossible to construct mechanisms that compensate agents for their
loss in privacy and achieve reasonable accuracy (in the sense that enough agents sell their information).
Our mechanisms provide an intermediate solution. First, we provide ε-differential privacy to all agents,
where the guarantee is with respect to their combined type, i.e., (ti, vi), and where ε decreases with the
number of agents n. This means that privacy improves as n grows.
Furthermore our constructions guarantee that truthfulness is dominant – taking information utility about
the combined type (ti, vi) into account – for all agents for which vi ≤ vmax, where under a very mild
assumption on the distribution of vi the bound vmax grows with n and the fraction of agents for which
vi > vmax decreases with n.
4 The Model
The Mechanism Let S be a finite set of alternatives (a.k.a. social alternatives), let T be a finite type
set and consider a set of n agents. We consider direct revelation mechanisms that given the declaration of
agents about their types selects a social alternative s ∈ S and makes s public. To isolate loss of privacy
due to publication of s from other potential sources of leakage, we will assume that every other information
(including, e.g., the agents’ declared types and individual monetary transfers) is completely hidden using
cryptographic or other techniques.
The Objective Function The goal of the designer is defined via a real, non-negative objective function
over the true types of the agents, f(t, s) that needs to be optimized (by choosing s).
f : T n × S → [0, n∆f ].
Following [DMNS06, MT07] we define the sensitivity of f to be
∆f = max |f(tˆ, s)− f(tˆ′, s)|
where the maximum is taken over all neighboring tˆ, tˆ′ ∈ T n and s ∈ S. We assume that for all s the minimum
value of f(t, s) is 0 and then, given that sensitivity is ∆f by a hybrid argument we get that f ≤ n∆f .
Privacy-Aware Agents We extend the traditional setting of selfish agents to include agents who care not
only about their utility uouti from the outcome s of the mechanism, but also about the (negative) information
utility uinfi incurred from the leakage of information about their private type through the public output s.
For simplicity, we consider a setting where the overall utility of an agent is the sum of the two:2
ui = u
out
i − uinfi .
An agent’s type τi is modeled by a pair τi = (ti, vi) ∈ T × R≥0, where T is the “traditional” game type
and vi is the privacy valuation of agent i. We emphasize that agents care about the privacy of the whole
pair and the information utility corresponds to the loss in privacy of both ti and vi (hence, one cannot
simply publish vi). The vectors t = (t1, . . . , tn) and v = (v1, . . . , vn) denote the types of all agents. Trying
to maximize her utility, agent i may hence act strategically and declare τ ′i = σi(τi) = (t
′
i, v
′
i) to M instead
of τi.
2Admittedly, this separation of the utility function is sometimes artificial. However, we find it conceptually helpful.
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The “traditional” game utility of agent i is defined as uouti : T × S → [−1, 1]. Following our discussion
above, we define uinfi : R
≥0 → R≥0, and the only assumption we make is that
uinfi (vi) ≤ vi · ε
for ε being the parameter of the differentially private mechanism executed (i.e., eε = max (M(t)(S)/M(t′)(S))
where the maximum is taken over all neighboring t, t′ ∈ T n and S′ ⊆ S). Note that unlike uouti that only
depends on the outcome of the mechanism, uinfi depends on the mechanism itself.
In our analysis we identify a subset of agents that we call participating for whom truthtelling is strictly
dominant. A mechanism approximately implements f if assuming that participating agents act truthfully
(and other agents act arbitrarily) it outputs s that approximately optimizes f .
4.1 Warmup: A Privacy-Aware Poll
The following simple electronic poll will serve to illustrate some of our ideas:
Example 2 (An Electronic Poll). An electronic publisher wishes to determine which of its m ≥ 2 electronic
magazines is more popular. Every agent is asked to specify her favorite magazine, i.e., ti ∈ [m], and will
receive in exchange an electronic copy of it. For simplicity, we assume that agents’ utility does not depend
on the poll outcome.
Following our convention, we assume ideal cryptography here, that is, no information beyond the outcome
of the poll is leaked. In particular, every agent receives the electronic magazine without anybody (including
the publisher) knowing which magazine has been transferred. Agents, however, are privacy-aware, and hence
take into account that the outcome of the poll itself reveals information about their preferences.
Denote by t′ the vector of agents’ declarations. For s ∈ [m] let f(s, t′) = |{i|t′i = s}| and note that
∆f = 1. Consider the exponential mechanism M = M
ε
2
f as in Definition 2. I.e.,
Pr[M(t′) = j] =
eεn
′
j/2∑m
ℓ=1 e
εn′
ℓ
/2
,
where n′j = f(j, t
′) is the number of agents who declared they rank magazine j first. By Theorem 1, M
preserves ε-differential privacy.
Note that if n′j ≥ n′ℓ + k then
Pr[M(t′) = ℓ] ≤ e
εn′ℓ/2
eεn
′
j
/2
≤ e
εn′ℓ/2
eε(n
′
ℓ
+k)/2
= e−εk/2.
Hence,
Pr[M(t′) outputs ℓ such that n′ℓ < max
j
n′j − k] ≤ (m− 1)e−εk/2.
The agent utilities are uouti − uinfi where
• uouti is the utility that the agent gains from receiving the magazine she specified she prefers. Note that
this utility depends only on the declared type and it is maximized for ti, the true type of the agent;
we assume that uouti (ti)− uouti (t′i) ≥ g (Alternatively, the publisher does not care if agent i reports t′i
if uouti (ti)− uouti (t′i) < g).
• uinfi ≤ ε · vi is the privacy loss from the mechanism.
Note that ε < g/vi suffices for making agent i truthful: acting untruthfully agent i will lose at least g in
uouti and gain no more than εvi in u
inf
i . Denote by nj the number of agents who rank magazine j first
(note the difference from n′j that correspond to declared types). To demonstrate that the mechanism is
efficient, we need to make some (hopefully reasonable) assumptions on the distribution of vi. We explore
three possibilities:
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Bounded vi We begin with a simplified setting where we assume that there exists vmax = O(1) such that
∀i : vi ≤ vmax. In this case it is enough to set ε < g/vmax = O(1) to make truthfulness dominant for all
agents. Hence, assuming all agents are truthful, we get n′j = nj for all j ∈ [m] and hence the probability
that M(t′) = M(t) outputs ℓ such that nℓ < maxj nj − k is bounded by (m− 1)e−εk/2.
Note that in this case the computation output leaks no information about the privacy valuations v.
Bounded vi, Except for a Small Number of Agents A more realistic setting allows for a small
number of agents with vi > vmax. We change the mechanism M to also consider the reported v
′
i so that
inputs from agents with v′i ≥ vmax are ignored. Regardless of what agents with vi > vmax report, we call
them non-participating.
As before, by setting ε < g/vmax we make truthfulness dominant for all agents with vi ≤ vmax. We can
hence guarantee a non-trivial accuracy. Let nnp be the number of non-participating agents. In the worst
case, non-participating agents deflate the count of a popular magazine and inflate the count of an unpopular
magazine, making it look more popular than it really is. Taking this into account, we get that
Pr[M(t′) outputs ℓ such that nℓ < max
j
nj − k − 2nnp] ≤ (m− 1)e−εk/2.
Note that we lose truthfulness for non-participating agents. We do, however, guarantee ε-differential
privacy for these agents.
Large Populations Assume we do not care if the mechanism does not output the most popular choice if
it does not have significant advantage over the other, e.g., when k + nnp = O(n
α) for some 0 < α < 1. This
allows us to set ε(n) = n−α and hence truthfulness is dominant for agents with vi ≤ g/ε = vmax(n) ∈ O(nα).
Note that vmax grows with n, hence we expect the fraction of non-participants nnp/n to diminish with n. If
n is large enough so that the fraction of agents for which vi > vmax(n) is at most 1/n
1−α then we get the
desired accuracy.
As before, we lose truthfulness for non-participating agents, and only guarantee ε(n)-differential privacy
for the non-participating agents. Note, however, that the fraction of non-participating agents diminishes
with n, and, furthermore, their privacy guarantee improves with n (i.e., ε(n) decreases).
4.2 Admissible Privacy Valuations
In the rest of the paper we only focus on large populations (the analysis can be easily modified for the
case where vi is bounded except for a small number of agents). We will design our mechanisms for “nicely-
behaving” populations:
Definition 4 (Admissible Valuations). A population of n agents is said to have (α, β)-admissible valuations
if
|{i : vi > nα}|
n
≤ n−β.
To partly justify our focus on admissible valuations, consider the case where vi are chosen, i.i.d., from
some underlying distribution D over R≥0.
Definition 5 (Admissible Valuation Distribution). A valuation distribution D is called (α, β)-admissible if
Pr
v∼D
[v > nα] = O(n−β).
Note that if D has finite expectation, then (using Markov’s inequality) Pr[v > nα] ≤ E[v]/nα = O(n−α),
and hence D is (α, β)-admissible for all β ≤ α. If D has finite variance then (using Chebyshev’s inequality)
Pr[v > nα] ≤ Var[v]/(nα − E[v])2 = O(n−2α), and hence D is (α, β)-admissible for all β ≤ 2α. More
generally, consider the following simple generalization of Chebyshev’s inequality to even pth moment:
Pr[|X −E[X ]| > t] = Pr[(X −E[X ])p > tp] ≤ E [(X −E[X ])
p]
tp
.
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Using this inequality in the argument above we get that if D has finite even pth moment then D is (α, β)-
admissible for all β ≤ pα. We conclude that if D has finite pth moment then D is (α, 1 − α)-admissible for
α ≥ 1/(p + 1). In particular, if D has finite moments of all orders then D is (α, 1 − α)-admissible for all
α ∈ (0, 1).
We can even consider a notion of strong admissibility:
Definition 6 (Strongly Admissible Valuation Distribution). A valuation distribution D is called α-strongly
admissible if
Pr
v∼D
[v > (logn)α] = n−ω(1),
where n−ω(1) denotes a function that is negligible in n.
For example, the Normal distribution is α-strongly admissible. In our analysis, however, we only use the
more conservative notion of admissibility as in definitions 4, 5.
These simple observations suggest that (α, 1−α)-admissibility is a relatively mild assumption that would
typically hold in large populations even for small values of α.
4.3 The Privacy-Aware Poll with Admissible Valuations
Returning to our example, let α be the smallest positive value such that the agent population can be assumed
to be (α, 1−α)-admissible. By setting vmax = nα and ε = g/vmax = gn−α we get that nnp ≤ n·n−(1−α) = nα.
Finally, setting k = nα(logn)2 logm/g we get the following:
Claim 1. The probability that M(t′) outputs ℓ such that nℓ < maxj nj − 2k is negligible in n.
5 A Generic Construction of Privacy-Aware Mechanisms
We now present a generic feasibility result for privacy-aware mechanisms. Our construction is based on the
construction of [NST12], where differential privacy is used as a tool for mechanism design. The hope is that
existence of this generic construction, a relatively simple modification of [NST12], is a signal that our model
of privacy-aware mechanisms allows constructing mechanisms for many other tasks.
Reactions We first change our model to incorporate the notion of reactions introduced in [NST12].3
Traditionally, an agent’s utility is a function of her private type and the social alternative, and the issue
of how agents exploit the social choice is not treated explicitly. In [NST12] this choice was made explicit
such that after a social choice is made agents need to take an action (denoted reaction) to exploit the social
alternative and determine their utility. In [NST12] (and likewise in this work) allowing the mechanism to
sometimes restrict the reactions of agents serves as a deterrent against non-truthful agents.
Let R be a finite set of reactions. We modify the definition of the utility from the outcome of the
mechanism to
uouti : T × S ×R→ [−1, 1].
Given ti, s define
ri(ti, s) = argmaxr∈R(u
out
i (ti, s, r))
to be the optimal reaction for agent i on outcome s.
To illustrate the concept of reactions, consider a mechanism for setting a price for a unlimited supply
good (such as in Example 3 appearing below). Once the mechanism chooses a price s the possible reactions
are buy (i.e., pay s and get the good) and not buy (i.e., do not pay s and do not get the good), and reactions
are kept hidden by assuming payment and reception of the digital good using perfect cryptography. In this
example agents reactions may be restricted to buy whenever they bid at least the selected price s, and not
buy otherwise.
3While the standard game-theoretic modeling does not explicitly include reactions, in many settings their introduction is
natural. We refer the reader to [NST12] for further discussion of this change in the standard model.
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Utility Gap We assume the existence of a positive gap g such that for all ti 6= t′i there exist s for which
the optimal reactions are distinct, and, furthermore, uouti (ti, s, ri(ti, s)) ≥ uouti (ti, s, ri(t′i, s)) + g. In many
setting, a gap g can be created by considering a discrete set of social choices. As in our polling example, an
alternative interpretation of the gap g may be that the mechanism designer not care if agent i reports t′i if
uouti (ti, s, ri(ti, s)) < u
out
i (ti, s, ri(t
′
i, s)) + g.
5.1 The Construction
Given a finite type set T , a finite set S of alternatives and an objective function f : T n × S → R with
sensitivity ∆f , we construct a mechanism for approximately implementing f .
Let n be the number of agents, and let α be the smallest positive value such that the agent population
can be assumed to be (α, 1 − α)-admissible. Let vmax = nα. The participating agents will be those with
privacy valuations lower than vmax. Choose t⊥ ∈ T to be an arbitrary element of T . Non-participating
agents will be asked to declare t⊥.
Let δ ∈ [0, 1], ε > 0 be parameters to be set later. Agents are asked to declare ti if vi ≤ vmax and t⊥
otherwise. Let t′i be the declaration of agent i. On input t
′ = t′1, . . . , t
′
n the mechanism executes as follows:
ALGORITHM 1: The generic mechanism M .
Input: A vector of types t′ ∈ Tn.
Output: A social choice s ∈ S.
M executes M1 with probability 1− δ and M2 otherwise, where M1,M2 are as follows:
Mechanism M1 For all s ∈ S and t
′
∈ Tn, choose s ∈ S according to the exponential mechanism M
ε
2∆f
f (t
′).
Mechanism M2 Choose s ∈ S uniformly at random.
The mechanism M also restrict all agents to their optimal reactions according to their declarations, i.e., ri(t
′
i, s).
4
We begin by analyzing for which agents truthtelling is a dominant strategy:
Claim 2. If (vmax + 4)ε ≤ δ g|S| then truthtelling is dominant for all agents with vi ≤ vmax.
Proof. We first analyze the effect of misreporting in M1 and M2:
Misreporting in M1 As u
out
i (ti, s, r) ∈ [−1, 1] we can use the simple corollary following Lemma 1 and
get that for all possible declarations of the other agents t′−i and all t
′
i:
Es∼M1(t′−i,t
′
i
)[u
out
i (ti, s, ri(t
′
i, s))]−Es∼M1(t′−i,ti)[uouti (ti, s, ri(ti, s))] ≤
Es∼M1(t′−i,t
′
i
)[u
out
i (ti, s, ri(t
′
i, s))]−Es∼M1(t′−i,ti)[uouti (ti, s, ri(t′i, s))] < 4ε,
where the first inequality follows from uouti (ti, s, ri(t
′
i, s)) ≤ uouti (ti, s, ri(ti, s)). In words, misreporting can
gain at most 4ε in the expected uouti .
5 Noting that misreporting can gain agent i at most vi · ε in uinfi , we
get that the total gain in utility due to misreporting by agents with vi ≤ vmax is (vmax + 4)ε.
Misreporting in M2 If t
′
i 6= ti then with probability at least 1|S| we get that ri(t′i, s) 6= ri(ti, s). Since the
mechanism restricts agent i’s reaction to ri(t
′
i, s) we get that
Es∼M2(t′−i,ti)[u
out
i (ti, s, ri(ti, s))]−Es∼M2(t′−i,t′i)[uouti (ti, s, ri(t′i, s))] ≥
g
|S| ,
4We note that for the analysis it suffices to restrict reactions only when M2 is activated.
5Similarly, even if reactions are not restricted when M1 is activated we get that: Es∼M1(t′−i,t
′
i
)[u
out
i (ti, s, ri(ti, s))] −
Es∼M1(t
′
−i
,ti)
[uouti (ti, s, ri(ti, s))] < 4ε. We only need reactions to be restricted when M2 is activated.
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where g is the minimal utility gap due to not acting according to the optimal reaction. Note that, as M2
ignores its input, misreporting does not yield a change in uinfi . We get that the total loss in utility in M2
due to misreporting is at least g/|S|.
We get that if (vmax+4)ε ≤ δ g|S| then overall gain in utility due to misreporting is negative for all agents
with vi ≤ vmax, hence truthtelling is dominant for these agents.
Let opt(t) = maxs∈S f(t, s) be the optimal value for f . We next show that our mechanism approximately
recovers opt(t).
Claim 3. If (vmax + 4)ε ≤ δ g|S| then
Es∼M(t′)][f(t, s)] ≥ opt(t)−∆f · (δn+ 2nα + 2 ln(n|S|)/ε) .
Proof. Define opt′ = maxs f(t
′, s). Denote by t¯k the vector constructed from the k first entries of t and the
n− k last entries of t′. For all s we have that
f(t′, s) = f(t¯0, s) =
n−1∑
k=0
(f(t¯k, s)− f(t¯k+1, s)) + f(t, s).
Note that by Claim 2 t′i 6= ti for at most nα entries, and hence f(t¯k, s)− f(t¯k+1, s) 6= 0 for at most nα values
of k, in which case it is upper bounded by ∆f . We get hence that opt′ ≥ opt(t)− nα∆f .
We get that M1(t
′) outputs s′ such that f(t′, s′) < opt′ − 2∆f ln(n|S|)/ε with probability
exp(εf(t′, s′)/2∆f)∑
s∈S exp(εf(t
′, s)/2∆f)
≤ exp(ε(opt
′ − 2∆f ln(n|S|)/ε)/2∆f)
exp(εopt′/2∆f)
=
1
n|S| .
Using the union bound (over elements of S), and the fact that opt′ ≤ n∆f , we get a lower bound on the
expected revenue of M1 as follows:
Es∼M1(t′)[f(t, s)] ≥ (opt′ − 2∆f ln(n|S|)/ε)
(
1− |S| 1
n|S|
)
≥ opt′ − 2∆f ln(n|S|)/ε−∆f
≥ opt(t)− 2nα∆f − 2∆f ln(n|S|)/ε.
We conclude that
Es∼M(t′)[f(t, s)] ≥ (1− δ)Es∼M1(t′)[f(t, s)]
≥ (1− δ) (opt(t)− 2nα∆f − 2∆f ln(n|S|)/ε)
≥ opt(t)− δn∆f − 2nα∆f − 2∆f ln(n|S|)/ε.
Setting ε = n−(1+α)/2
√
g ln(n|S|)/|S| and δ = 2n(α−1)/2
√
|S| ln(n|S|)/g we get
Theorem 2. Let n be the number of agents, T be a finite type set and S a finite set of alternatives. Let
f : T n×S → R be an objective function with sensitivity ∆f andM be the mechanism described in Algorithm 1.
If α is such that the agent population can be assumed to be (α, 1−α)-admissible, then M recovers opt(t)
to within additive difference of O
(
∆fn(1+α)/2
√
|S| ln(n|S|)/g
)
.
The relative accuracy of our mechanisms, in the sense of the difference between the optimal value when
agents are privacy-aware or not, increases with larger populations. As described before, natural distributions
of the privacy valuations will be (α, 1 − α)-admissible even for very small values of α, and therefore the
dominating term in the expression in Theorem 2 can be made arbitrarily close to O˜(
√
n).
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5.2 Example: Privacy-Aware Selling of Digital Goods
We describe now an example of a natural privacy-aware mechanism that naturally falls within our framework.
Example 3 (Pricing a Digital Good). An auctioneer selling a digital good wishes to design a single price
mechanism that would (approximately) optimize her revenue. Every party has a valuation ti ∈ Q =
{0, 1q , 2q , . . . , 1} for the good (for some constant q), and a privacy preference vi. Agents are asked to de-
clare τi = (ti, vi) to the mechanism, which chooses a price p for the good. Denote by τ
′
i = (t
′
i, v
′
i) the actual
declaration of agent i. If t′i ≥ p then agent i receives the good and pays p, otherwise, agent i learns p but
does not pay nor receive the good. Agents prefer receiving the good to not receiving it.
• The utility uout is the ‘traditional’ utility, i.e., zero if agent i does not receive the good, and ti−p+ 12q
otherwise, where the additive 12q is used for modeling preference to receive the good.
• For uinf, we assume that whether agent i received the good and paid for it can be kept completely hidden
from all other parties (this can be implemented using cryptographic techniques). Hence, only leakage
due to making p public affects uinf.
Consider now the auctioneer from Example 3, and assume that the valuations ti are taken from T =
{0, 1q , 2q , . . . , 1} and similarly, the price p ∈ S = { 1q , 2q , . . . , 1} for some integer constant q > 1. Let α be the
smallest value such that the agent population can be assumed to be (α, 1− α)-admissible.
Defining the reactions to be {buy,not buy} and optimal reactions ri(t, p) = buy if t ≥ p and not buy
otherwise we get that the gap g is 1/2q.
Suppose the designer goal is to recover the optimal revenue, i.e., maxp∈S f(t, p) where f(t, p) = p · |{i :
ti ≥ p}| and note that ∆f = 1.
Using Theorem 2 we get a privacy-aware mechanism that recovers the optimal revenue to within additive
difference of O
(
∆fn(1+α)/2
√
|S| ln(n|S|)/g
)
= O
(
n(1+α)/2q
√
ln(nq)
)
.
Note that the accuracy of this privacy aware mechanism is only (essentially) a factor O˜(n
α
2 ) away from
the similar (non-privacy aware) mechanism from [NST12].
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let t, t′, g be as in the lemma.
Es∼M(t)[g(s)] =
∑
s∈S
M(t)(s)g(s) ≤
∑
s∈S
eεM(t′)(s)g(s) = eε · Es∼M(t′)[g(s)],
where the inequality follows since M provides ε-differential privacy, and g is non-negative. For ε ≤ 1 and
g : S → [0, 1] we get
Es∼M(t)[g(s)]−Es∼M(t′)[g(s)] ≤ (eε − 1) · Es∼M(t′)[g(s)] ≤ eε − 1,
where the last inequality holds because g returns a values in [0, 1]. Similarly, we get Es∼M(t′)[g(s)] −
Es∼M(t)[g(s)] ≤ eε − 1, hence
∣∣Es∼M(t)[g(s)]−Es∼M(t′)[g(s)]∣∣ ≤ eε − 1 < 2ε,
where the last inequality follows noting that (eε − 1) ≤ 2ε for 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let t, t′ be neighboring, and S′ ⊆ S.
M
ε
2∆f
f (t)(S
′) =
∑
s∈S′
exp( ε2∆f f(s, t))∑
s′∈S exp(
ε
2∆f f(s
′, t))
=
∑
s∈S′
exp( ε2∆f (f(s, t)− f(s, t′))) exp( ε2∆f f(s, t′))∑
s′∈S exp(
ε
2∆f ((f(s
′, t)− f(s′, t′))) exp( ε2∆f f(s′, t′)))
≤
∑
s∈S′
exp( ε2 ) exp(
ε
2∆f f(s, t
′))∑
s′∈S exp(− ε2 ) exp( ε2∆f f(s′, t′)))
= exp(ε)M εf (t)(S
′),
where the inequality follows by recalling that ∆f ≥ |f(s, t)− f(s, t′)| for all s, t, t′.
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